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Comments
REFUGEE-PAROLEE: THE DILEMMA
OF THE INDOCHINA REFUGEE
INTRODUCTION
Recently, President Ford used the parole authority' to admit
150,000 refugees who fled from the conflict in Indochina.2 How-
ever, these refugees are not considered to have entered 3 the United
States because, as parolees, they are legally regarded as if stopped
at the border.4 The dichotomy between physical presence and
legal status is inherent in the parole statute, but the resultant prob-
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5)
(1970). Section 212 (d) (5) provides that:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for
emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public in-
terest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but
such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of
the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion
of the Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith
return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled
and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United
States.
2. The parole of the Indochina refugees was authorized by the Attorney
General, acting at the "urgent request" of the President. 33 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 839 (1975).
3. Entry distinguishes those aliens who are recognized as having a legal
presence. The physical entry of a parolee into the United States does not
affect his legal status. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
4. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 189 (1958).
lems are multiplied by the use of parole as authority for the admis-
sion of a large group of refugees. The President's actions have gone
beyond the use which Congress had originally intended for the
parole statute5 and may cause serious problems for some of the
Indochina refugees.
PARoLE Aumoarr: AN OvEmvivw
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides an orderly scheme
for the entry of aliens into the United States.6 Under the Act,
an alien seeking entry into the United States must meet stringent
requirements7 before entry will be allowed. In enacting these re-
quirements Congress recognized that in some cases an alien would
need to enter the country before the visa requirements could be
fulfilled.8 In order to provide immigration officials with the au-
thority necessary to deal with these cases, Congress enacted the pa-
role statute,9 Which authorized the parole of otherwise inadmissible
aliens into the United States. To implement the provision, Con-
gress accorded the Attorney General'0 the discretionary power to
grant parole in those cases which he deemed meritorious.1' De-
spite the statutory authority, the President has usually made the
decision to exercise the parole power in those instances where a
large group of refugees have sought entry into this country.'2
The Attorney General has then approved the President's decision
which has been implemented by the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service.
5. See Hearings on Indochina Refugees Before the Subcomm. on Immi-
gration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 47 (1975). As Congressman Cohen
noted: "It seems from the whole tenor of the discussion that it [parole]
is on a permanent basis as far as the State Department and others might
be concerned."
6. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 201-240, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1230
(1970).
7. Id. §§ 212(a) (1)-(31), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (1)-(31) (1970).
8. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1653, 1706 (1952).
9. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5)
(1970).
10. The discretionary power is delegated to the Attorney General, but
he in turn is authorized to delegate his authority to immigration officials.
Compare Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1970), with 8 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1975).
11. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5)
(1970).
12. The decision to evacuate refugees from Communist regimes is essen-
tially a foreign policy decision which has been made by the President and
the Department of State.
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Parole is an unusual provision because it circumvents standard
entry procedure by allowing an otherwise excludable alien to enter
the United States.' 3 Parole is not, however, a grant of admis-
sion. Although a parolee may physically be within the United
States, legally he has not entered because he has not met the en-
trance requirements.14 The parolee occupies a unique position,
one thought to be merely an enlargement of the confinement
which an excluded alien would face when stopped at the border.' 5
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMIENT AM USE OF PAROLE
Pre-Statutory Parole
The procedure of allowing excluded aliens to enter the United
States was developed during the 1920's as an administrative practice
without statutory authority.16 At first, parole was used by im-
migration officials to avoid holding aliens in custody pending their
exclusion.17 The Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated
a similar practice during World War II as a means of dealing with
alien enemies.' 8 Parole allowed these aliens some freedom, while
they technically remained in custody. The early administrative
practices and the wartime enemy alien parole were formalized into
Immigration and Naturalization operating instructions in the years
following the war.19 These instructions gave the Immigration and
Naturalization Service district directors the discretionary authority
to temporarily release excludable aliens into this country.20 Al-
though used primarily in deportation proceedings, parole was also
used during this period to permit excluded aliens to enter the
United States to defend criminal actions, to testify in criminal cases
for the Government, to apply for registry, and to permit adjustment
of status.2 '
13. By definition, an alien found excludable would not be allowed to en-
ter. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(1970).
14. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958).
15. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953).
16. In re L-Y-Y-, 9 1. & N. Dec. 70, 71 (1960).
17. See Kaplan v. Todd, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925).
18. 1946 INS AxN. REP. 34.
19. Id. at 35.
20. 1950 INS ANm. REP. 49, 50.
21. Id.
Thus, the Immigration Service had a fully developed procedure
for paroling aliens into the United States prior to the enactment
of any statutory authority.22 Parole was, however, only used in
those "circumstances where the case was exceptionally meritorious
and [where] immediate deportation would be inhumane."' 2 Dur-
ing the period when parole was granted without statutory authority
no large group of refugees was paroled into the United States.24
Statutory Parole
In 1952, Congress substantially revised the Immigration laws
by enacting the McCarren-Walter Act.25  Initially, the Act in-
cluded a limited parole provision which restricted parole to those
aliens who required medical treatment in the United States.20
The Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Attorney Gen-
eral, however, urged that the statute reflect the existing practice
of paroling aliens under all emergent and humanitarian circum-
stances.27 In accepting these proposals the Joint Committee Re-
port stated:
The provision in the instant bill represents an acceptance of the
recommendation of the Attorney General with reference to this
form of discretionary relief. The committee believes that thebroader discretionary authority is necessary to permit the Attorney
General to parole inadmissible aliens into the United States in
emergency cases, such as the case of an alien who requires imme-
diate medical attention before there has been an opportunity for
an immigration officer to inspect him, and in cases where it is
strictly in the public interest to have an inadmissible alien present
in the United States, such as, for instance, a witness or for purposes
of prosecution. 8
While neither the committee report nor the statute explicitly
dealt with the question of whether parole was to be used to admit
large groups of people, the statute was drafted using the singular
22. Hearings on H.R. 2816 & S. 716 Before the Joint Subcomm. on Im-
migration and Naturalization of the Senate and House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 713 (1951).
23. 1950 INS ANN. REP. 49, 50.
24. See 1940-1952 INS ANN. REP.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82 Cong., 2d Sess. in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1653, 1706 (1952); Hearings on H.R. 2816 & S. 716 Before the Joint
Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate and House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 713 (1951) (statement of Pey-
ton Ford, Deputy Att'y Gen.).
26. Note, Leng May Ma v. Barber, 27 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 373, 374 n.11(1959).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. in 2 U.S. CODE: CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1653, 1706 (1952).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
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phrase "an alien."2 9 Statements made later by a member of the
drafting committee, Michael Feighan, support the theory that the
statute was intended to be used only in individual cases. Congress-
man Feighan stated: "It [the parole statute] was intended as a
remedy for individual hardship cases, no more, no less."8 0  The
Congressman also specifically noted that the committee did not in-
tend parole to be used as authority for the admission of large groups
of people.31 "I know at the time we were thinking in terms of
individuals in distress rather than any group. '32 Thus, the early
Immigration Service practices, the wording of the statute, and the
statements of Mr. Feighan demonstrate that the parole authority
was enacted to allow the Immigration Service to continue to parole
individuals.83
1956-1975: A History of Parole Misuse
President Eisenhower was the first President to use the parole
statute as a means of granting admission to a large group of refu-
gees. By authorizing the parole of refugees from the Hungarian
Revolution,34 the President initiated the misuse of the parole pro-
vision. While the decision to grant parole to the Hungarian refu-
gees was made when Congress was not in session,35 spokesmen of
both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees informally ad-
vised the Department of State that parole "provides the proper and
lawful instrumentality for coping with the emergency in a manner
consistent with the policy outlined by the President .... 36 This
29. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5)
(1970).
30. HousE SUBCOMM. ON IMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROB-
LEMs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, at 160 (1964).
31. Id. at 108.
32. Id. at 133.
33. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROB-
LEMs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, at 66, 67 (1963).
34. PREsmEN TAL PAPERS OF DWIGHT D. EIsEowER 1116-17 (1956) (White
House statement concerning the admission of additional Hungarian refu-
gees).
35. HOUSE SUBco1\nV. ON IMIIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OF THE
Coi~M. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROB-
LEMS, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, at 67 (1963).
36. Hearings on H.R. 7700 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Naturalization of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 13, pt. 2, at 485 (1964).
advice effectively sanctioned the President's misuse of the parole
authority.
President Eisenhower's action set three important precedents
which he and his successors would later use as authority for
their future use of parole37 This action established that parole
could be used to allow groups of refugees to enter the United
States; that a President could make the decision to use parole; and
that parole could be used as authority to allow individuals to enter
the United States for permanent residence.
Three years after paroling the Hungarian refugees, President
Eisenhower announced that the United States would participate in
the World Refugee Year by accepting refugees from throughout the
world.38  In order to implement the President's proclamation, Con-
gress enacted the "Fair Share Refugee Law," which specifically au-
thorized the granting of parole to large groups of refugees. 9 By
authorizing this use of parole, Congress acted contrary to its own
previously declared intention 0 that parole be used only in individ-
ual cases.
The parole provision was again misused to allow large groups of
Cuban refugees to enter the United States. Initially, Cuban refu-
gees were admitted by nonimmigrant visas, but in 1961, as the influx
of refugees increased, the Immigration Service adopted a policy of
allowing Cuban refugees to come into the United States on parole.4 1
The parole of Cuban refugees has continued throughout the 1960's
and early 1970's.42
In 1962, President Kennedy authorized the parole of a large group
of Chinese who had been forced to move from mainland China to
Hong Kong.43 The executive was not, however, the only govern-
mental body to use parole as a means of admitting a large group of
refugees; the Department of State, with the approval of the Chair-
37. See Presidential Proclamation of Dwight D. Eisenhower, May 19, 1959
in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3127-28 (1960). See also Act of July
14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504.
38. Presidential Proclamation of Dwight D. Eisenhower, May 19, 1959 in
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3127-28 (1960).
39. Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504.
40. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1653, 1706 (1952).
41. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OF THE
CoMnvr. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMIGRATION PROB-
LEMS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, at 106 (1964).
42. See 1970-1974 INS ANN. REP.
43. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON InmIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROn-
LEMS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, at 91 (1964).
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man of the House Subcommittee on Immigration (acting without
committee approval) 44 used parole to admit a group of Russian
Orthodox Church Old Believers.4 5 The initial misuse of the parole
provision by President Eisenhower to admit the Hungarian refugees
had become precedent for the continued use of the parole provision
to allow the entry of large refugee groups.
In 1965, Congress undertook the first major revision of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952. This revision abolished the
national origins quota system46 which had restricted the number
of aliens admitted to the United States by limiting the number of
visas available to each country. In place of the quota system, Con-
gress enacted a system of preference categories which determined
visa eligibility by preference qualification rather than by national
origin.47 The seventh preference in the new system provided for
the conditional entry of refugees, but limited the number of condi-
tional entrants to 10,200 from non-Western Hemisphere countries.
48
Commenting on the seventh preference provision, the Senate Com-
mittee Report noted that the procedure of "conditional entry of re-
fugees as proposed by this bill is not unlike the parole procedure
utilized during the existence of the so-called Fair Share Act
.... )49 The report, however, went on to state:
Inasmuch as definite provision has now been made for refugees, it
is the express intent of the committee that the parole provisions of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, which remain unchanged by
this bill, be administered in accordance with the original intention
of the drafters of that legislation [8 U.S.C. § 212(d) (5) (1970).]
The parole provisions were designed to authorize the Attorney Gen-
eral to act only in emergent, individual, and isolated situations, such
as the case of an alien who requires immediate medical attention,
and not for the immigration of classes or groups outside of the limit
of the law.50
44. Hearings on H.R. 7700 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Naturalization of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 13, pt. 2, at 486 (1964).
45. HOUSE SUBCOanMr. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OF THE
COMMV. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMIIGRATION PROB-
LEMS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, at 107 (1964).
46. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 201-204, 66 Stat. 175-79 (1952),
as amended 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1154 (1970).
47. Id. §§ 203(a) (1)-(7), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) (1)-(7) (1970).
48. Id. § 203(a) (7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (7).
49. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1965).
50. Id. (emphasis added).
On April 21, 1975, President Ford directed the Attorney General
to authorize parole for 130,000 refugees from Indochina.51 The
President's use of parole was contrary to the previously expressed
intent of Congress, but consistent with the interpretation and use
of the parole authority established by his predecessors.5 2  Over
the past nineteen years, the executive has developed its own con-
cept and use of parole as authority for the entry of large groups
of refugees. Although Congress has acquiesced in the Presidents'
actions,5" the statute itself still reflects the previous belief and un-
derstanding of Congress that parole was to be used in individual
cases. The conflict between executive use and Congressional intent
poses major problems for refugees on parole.
PROBLEMS OF THE PAROLEE
Parole v. Entry-The Problem of Metaphysical Status
The United States Supreme Court in Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei54 held that an alien's temporary detention on
Ellis Island did not constitute an "entry" for immigration purposes.
The Court extended the Shaughnessy holding in Leng May Ma v.
Barber55 by ruling that a parolee had not "entered" the United
States, although the alien was physically present within the coun-
try. The Court found that parole was "simply a device through
which needless confinement is avoided"5' 0 and that a parole grant
did not affect the parolee's legal status.57 As will be demon-
strated, this dichotomy between physical presence and legal status
directly affects the rights of paroled aliens.
The Parole Grant
Because parole is a privilege extended by the government, the
parole grant can be conditioned. A parolee may be restricted to
a specific geographical area or required to report to an immigration
official on a weekly, monthly, or yearly basis.58 The terms of the
51. 33 CONG. Q. WEExLy REP. 839 (1975).
52. See text accompanying notes 34-45 supra.
53. Acquiescence is implied by the enactment of the statutes authorizing
adjustment of status for parolees.
54. 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953).
55. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
56. Id. at 190.
57. Id. at 188.
58. Hearings on Indochina Refugees Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 101 (1975) (statement of James Greene,
Deputy Comm. INS).
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parole may also be changed after parole has been granted.5 9 The
parolee has little voice in determining the conditions of parole.
Like the grant of parole itself, the conditions are determined by
the Attorney General. 0
Revocation of Parole
The Attorney General can terminate an alien's parole status if
he determines that the purpose of the entry has been met.6' In
the case of an alien paroled into the United States to defend a crim-
inal action, parole is ended when the sentence is served. 2 Simi-
larly, in the case of an alien admitted for medical treatment, parole
expires at the end of the treatment. 63 Parole may also be revoked
if it appears that a parolee is excludable under any of the provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
64
In enacting the parole provision, Congress did not grant parolees
any constitutional rights. The Attorney General may revoke an
alien's parole without informing him of the grounds for revoca-
tion 5 and without a hearing.66 With only one exception, 67 the
power of the Attorney General to revoke parole without a hearing
has been upheld. 8 The courts have allowed the Attorney General
to act unrestrained by procedural due process requirements, be-
cause, as the Supreme Court noted in Shaughnessy v. Unite. States
ex rel. Mezei: "Courts have long recognized the power to ex-
pel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exer-
59. Id. at 104.
60. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5)
(1970).
61. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (a) (1975).
62. In re Accardi, 14 I. & N. Dec. - (I.D. 2206, 1973); In re K-, 9 I. &
N. Dec. 143, 157 (1961).
63. United States ex rel. Lain Ha Cheung v. Esperdy, 345 F.2d 989, 990
(2d Cir. 1965).
64. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(a) (1)-(31), 8 U.S.C. §§
1182 (a) (1)-(31) (1970).
65. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a) (1975).
66. Id.
67. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 612 (2d Cir.
1958).
68. United States ex tel. Stellas v. Esperdy, 366 F.2d 266, 268 (2d Cir.
1966); United States ex rel. Lam Hal Cheung v. Esperdy, 345 F.2d 989, 990
(2d Cir. 1965); Ahrens v. Rojas, 292 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1961); In -re
M-B-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 406, 407 (1959).
cised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control."6 9
Exclusion
After parole is revoked, the alien is treated as if he were apply-
ing for admission.70 His prior presence in the United States is
not considered. Accordingly, the parolee becomes subject to exclu-
sion procedures rather than deportation even though he is physi-
cally within the country.71 Although the Immigration Service does
not have to recognize the parolee's prior presence in the country
for purposes of affording the alien the advantages of deportation,
the Service can use events which occurred during the alien's parole
as grounds for exclusion. 72 Thus, the parolee is considered pre-
sent in the country for one purpose and yet is treated as if he had
never entered for another.
In a number of cases the Immigration Service has successfully
excluded aliens based upon objectionable events78 which occurred
while the aliens were on parole. For example, in In re Stoyt-
cheff, 74 an alien who was paroled into the United States was later
excluded when it was determined that he had become mentally in-
competent. Aliens who have been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude while on parole have also been excluded. In In
re Sanchez-Marin,75 Cuban parolees were excluded because they
were convicted of manslaughter while on parole. In each of these
cases the basis for exclusion occurred while the alien was on pa-
role, although legally he was not recognized as being present within
the country. The problem was summarized by a federal district
court when it commented, "[i]ndeed, the legal fiction strains cre-
dulity .... ,76
Once parole has been revoked, the alien is examined by an immi-
gration official in order to determine if he is eligible for admission
into the United States.77 At all times the alien has the burden
69. 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).
70. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5)
(1970).
71. Deportation is only used against an alien who has actually entered.
See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958).
72. Klapholz v. Esperdy, 201 F. Supp. 294, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aft'd, 302
F.2d 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962).
73. See 8 C:F.R. § 235.1(d) (1975).
74. 11 I. & N. Dec. 329, 331 (1965).
75. 11 I. & N. Dec. 264, 267 (1965).
76. United States ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy, 250 F. Supp. 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
77. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (a) (1975).
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of establishing that his case is meritorious and that he should be
allowed to enter.78 If the examining officer decides that the alien
is not "clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land"79 then the
case is referred to a special inquiry officer. The special inquiry
officer is required "to conduct proceedings ... to determine
whether an arriving alien . . . shall be allowed to enter or shall
be excluded and deported."8 0 A hearing is not required to deter-
mine admissibility; all that is required is an essentially fair pro-
ceeding."' Hence, the classification of the parolee as an excludable
alien serves to deny him the procedural protections accorded an
alien who has "entered" and subjects him to more limited exclusion
proceedings.
Judicial Review
The decision to exclude an alien is made by the special inquiry
officer or, in certain cases, by the regional commissioner based upon
his evaluation of the merits of an alien's application.82  The alien
has the right to appeal his exclusion to the Board of Immigration
Appeals, 8 3 except if he has been found excludable because of mental
illness, disease, or for national security reasons.8 4 If his appeal
is rejected by the Board, he can then seek judicial review by filing
a petition for habeas corpus or declaratory judgment in a federal
appellate court.8 5 The court will limit its review to determining
whether the Board committed a flagrant abuse of discretion," and
absent a finding of such abuse, the alien will be excluded.
An alien who is found excludable because his presence endangers
the national security or because he is found to be a subversive has
even less of an opportunity to discover the basis of his exclusion."
78. Immigration and Nationality Act § 203 (d), 8 U.S.C. § 1153.(d) (1970).
79. Id. § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(b).
80. Id. § 236 (a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a).
81. Sui Fung Luk v. Rosenberg, 276 F. Supp. 909, 912 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
affd, 409 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1969).
82. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a) (1970).
83. Id. § 236 (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (b).
84. See id. § 235 (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c).
85. See Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 184 (1956); Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1970).
86. Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966); Wan Ching
Shek v. Esperdy, 304 F. Supp. 1086, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
87. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(b) (1975).
The case, of an alien found excludable on these grounds is referred
directly to the regional commissioner.88  The alien may submit a
statement or any other information which he believes would be
helpful,89 but the regional commissioner may decide the case and
order immediate exclusion without revealing the information on
which he based his decision.90 An alien excluded under these pro-
visions has no right to an administrative appeal; his only appeal
is to the courts
A parolee who has been unable to win either an administrative
or judicial appeal must be sent to the "country from whence he
came." 91 This phrase has been construed to mean "that country
in which the alien has a place of abode and which he leaves with
the intention of coming ultimately to this country." 92 Unlike the
deported alien, who may designate the country to which he will
be deported,98 the excluded parolee has no choice. As the Second
Circuit stated; "[t]here can be only one country-'the country' in
the words of the statute ....
The alien who has been paroled into the United States remains
subject to the "direct control" of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service for the entire period of his parole.9 5 At any time
parole can be summarily revoked if, in the opinion of the Attorney
General or his delegate, the alien has become excludable or his
presence is no longer in the public interest.98 These harsh results
can be explained by reconsidering the intended purpose of the stat-
ute. The parole provision was enacted as a temporary remedy for
hardship cases, consequently Congress did not furnish parolees any
procedural safeguards.97 The current use of the parole authority
to admit the Indochina refugees reveals the fallacy of using parole
to admit a large group of refugees. These refugees have come to
88. Id. § 235.8 (a).
89. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235 (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (c) (1970).
90. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8 (b) (1975).
91. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237 (a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a) (1970).
92. United States v. Holland-American Line, 231 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir.
1956).
93. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1970).
94. Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 651 (2d Cir. 1969).
95. Hearings on Indochina Refugees Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 101 (1975) (statement of James Greene,
Deputy Comm. INS).
96. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d) (5)(1970).
97. Compare Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1970), with Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).
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the United States with the expectation of becoming permanent resi-
dents, but because they have been admitted on parole, the Indo-
china refugees will face the possibility of exclusion until they are
allowed to end parole and adjust status.
ENDING PAROLE
In the past, both Congress and the executive branch have per-
ceived the dilemma arising from the use of parole as the first step
in securing permanent residence for large numbers of refugees. As
Congressman Feighan noted:
Keeping these people in a parole status indefinitely minimizes the
good will we created throughout the world by taking them into
our country in the first instance. Moreover, the indefinite parole
status cannot help but, with the passing of time, set the... refu-
gees apart from the rest of American society .... 98
In order to alleviate these problems, Congress enacted specific legis-
lation authorizing an adjustment of status to permanent resident
for refugee-parolees. Congress passed legislation authorizing ad-
justment of status for Hungarian parolees in 1958.99 A similar pro-
vision was enacted as part of the Fair Share Relief Act in 1960,100
and in 1966 Congress authorized adjustment of status for Cuban
parolees.101 In each of these instances Congress recognized the
dilemma caused by the misuse of parole and determined that the
best solution was to authorize an adjustment of status for refugee-
parolees.' 02
The presence of the Indochina refugees again raises the problem
of finding a means of enabling these parolees to quickly adjust to
permanent residence status. Members of Congress have already
recognized that:
They [Indochina refugees] are, in a sense, under our jurisdiction
now and we can act accordingly, but eventually how they are
treated with respect to the use of parole authority and thereafter,
how they may be treated in terms of adjusting their status from
simply being on parole to being a citizen is the problem. 103
98. H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. in 2 U.S. CODE CONG, & AD.
NEWS 2027-28 (1957).
99. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419.
100. Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504.
101. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161.
102. See statutes cited notes 99-101 supra'
103. 121 CONG. REC. 4011 (daily ed. May 14, 1975) (remarks of Congress-
man Sarbanes).
Since Congress believes that these parolees are intended to become
permanent residents of the United States,10 4 the problem is in
enacting legislation which will allow them to achieve this status.
Adjusting Status Under Current Provisions
The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes an adjustment
of status to permanent resident if a parolee can meet the require-
ments for admission, is currently eligible to receive a visa, and
can convince the Attorney General to exercise his discretion fa-
vorably10 5 However, each of these requirements poses a barrier
to the Indochina parolee attempting to adjust status.
Numerical Limitations
The number of immigration visas available to aliens from coun-
tries not within the Western Hemisphere is limited to 170,000 per
year. 06 The total number of visas is allocated among seven
preference categories.10 7 Aliens applying for a visa within each
preference category must compete with other aliens in each cate-
gory for the limited number of visas available. 08 No particular
number of visas is allocated to any specific country, but no more
than 20,000 visas are available to aliens from any one country
within one year. 09  If the particular category in which the pas-
rolee has sought to obtain a visa is oversubscribed, his application
for an adjustment of status will be denied. The same result will
occur if the 20,000 person limit is exceeded for the country from
which the parolee has come.
The problems which faced the Cuban refugee-parolees in adjust-
ing their status are suggestive of those which the Indochina refugees
may face. Initially, when Congress authorized adjustment of status
for Cuban parolees, there were no numerical limitations on the
number of visas available to Western Hemisphere immigrants. 110
The imposition of numerical limitations in July 1968, caused dis-
proportionately large numbers of Cuban parolees to adjust their
status in May and June of 1968.1" It was recognized that the
104. Hearings on Indochina Refugees Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 47 (remarks of Congressman Cohen).
105. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).
106. Id. § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1351(a).
107. Id. § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a).
108. 111 CoNG. REc. 21,589 (1965) (remarks of Congressman Feighan).
109. Immigration and Nationality Act § 202, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970).
110. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161.
111. 1968 INS ANx. REP. 7.
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ensuing limitations on the availability of visas would substantially
lengthen the time required to adjust status.112 Similarly, the
current numerical limitations serve to diminish the possibility that
the Indochina refugees will be able to quickly end their parole by
adjusting status.1 3
The Problem of Discretion
The parolee who has met the objective requirements for admis-
sion must still persuade the Attorney General to grant his applica-
tion for adjustment of status. 14 As the statute is now construed,
the alien who has fulfilled the statutory prerequisites is merely
eligible for an adjustment of status.1 5 Thus, the parolee has
the burden of proving that his application "merits favorable
consideration.' ' " 6 However, since the decision to grant an adjust-
ment is wholly discretionary, a parolee has no guidelines to follow
in attempting to argue the merits of his application." 7 In com-
menting on the difficulties in the adjustment process, the Third Cir-
cuit noted:
It is this lack of any express or implicit specification of policy ob-
jectives or standards or even relevant factors, either in § 1255 or in
the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, which makes
the exercise of discretion by his delegate an utterly unguided and
unpredictable undertaking. Only the inevitable necessity of dis-
posing of the case is specified, like a result without a cause. What
is the desired goal and what guides should channel the course to it
receive no recognition."18
Obtaining a favorable decision from the Attorney General will not
be an obstacle for all of the Indochina refugees, but for some of
the parolees it will pose a formidable problem.119
112. 1969 INS ANx. REP. 9.
113. See Gestuvo v. District Director of United States INS, 337 F. Supp.
1093, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
114. Jarecha v. INS, 417 F.2d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 1969).
115. Astudillo v. INS, 443 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1971).
116. Santos v. INS, 375 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1967).
117. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).
118. Ameeriar v. INS, 438 F.2d 1028, 1042 (3d Cir. 1971) (Freedman, J.,
dissenting).
119. Questions regarding the background of some of the Indochina refu-
gees and the possibility of not allowing an adjustment of status have al-
ready been raised. See Hearings on Indochina Refugees Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 30-50.
If the parolee's application for adjustment of status is denied,
then he may appeal the decision to a federal court. However,
the scope of judicial review is limited because of the discre-
tionary nature of the decision involved. 20 If the reviewing court
does not determine that there was an abuse of discretion,121 then
the alien will be unable to adjust status.
Remedial Proposals
The limitations 122 on adjusting status under existing statutory
provisions suggest that Congress will have to proceed outside these
provisions in order to allow the Indochina refugees to end parole
within a relatively short time. Remedial legislation will have to
circumvent the numerical visa limitations in order to provide an
easier means for allowing the Indochina refugees to adjust their
status. Legislation of this kind would serve to limit the duration
of parole and the problems which can arise from it. In enacting
such legislation, Congress should also specify those qualities which
it believes are necessary for a parolee to adjust status. A list of
qualifications would serve to aid immigration officials in determin-
ing which parolees should be allowed to adjust status and also in-
form the parolees of the qualifications which are necessary if an
adjustment of status is desired.
CONCLUSION
The continued use of parole by the executive branch to admit
large groups of refugees indicates that the parole statute should be
amended to prevent future abuse. Numerical limitations could be
imposed which would restrict the number of parolees admitted each
year. By limiting the number of parolees, Congress would effec-
tively prevent the type of misuse which has occurred. However,
if Congress should decide that paroling large groups of refugees
into the United States is a proper use of the parole authority, then
it should pass legislation which would eliminate the problems which
the Indochina parolees now face. Parole has been used as if it were
a grant of admission, yet parolees are denied the privileges granted
to resident aliens. 2 3 When parole is "more in the nature of an
120. Astudillo v. INS, 443 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1971); Maturo v. INS,
404 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1968).
121. An abuse of discretion was defined by the Fifth Circuit as a decision
that was "arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by the reasonable, substan-
tial and probative evidence on the record as a whole." Jarecha v. INS, 417
F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 1969).
122. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).
123. A parolee remains subject to exclusion and its limited procedural
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entry [rather] than a detention" parolees should be granted the
same status as other aliens who have legally entered the United
States.124 In order to give refugee-parolees a legal status which
comports with the reason for their parole,125 Congress should
enact legislation which would provide parolees with permanent
resident status within thirty days after their arrival in the United
States. By enacting such a provision, Congress would accord pa-
rolees the same rights as resident aliens and would prevent the in-
equities which presently result from the use of the parole authority.
MAW viN SAmuEL GRoss
protections. However, the alien who has "entered" enjoys the full protec-
tion of a due process hearing in deportation proceedings. See, e.g., 1 C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IiMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.18 (rev. ed.
1975).
124. Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 1, 6 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1973), prob. juris.
noted, 416 U.S. 980 (1974).
125. See Hearings on Indochina Refugees Before the Subcomm. on Immi-
gration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 47 (remarks of Congressman Cohen).
